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AN EVALUATION OF THE 2000 CENSUS
AND CENSUS BUREAU EFFORTS TO MEASURE
THE GROSS AND NET RATES OF UNDERCOUNT*
EUGENE ERICKSEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Census 2000 has been marked by controversy and debate, both political
and academic.' On one side of the debate are those who favor the use of
sampling and statistical models to adjust for the inevitable undercount of
the population. 2 Opposed are those who believe both that any estimation
will create more error than it removes and that the goal of the census should
be to reduce the undercount with better procedures. 3
Census 2000 was unprecedented in terms of its budget-more money
was spent on it than on any previous census. 4 Its achievements are im-
pressive. 5 Not only did the Census Bureau reduce the net undercount below
the levels of previous censuses, it also reduced the differentials between the
non-Iiispanic White and minority undercounts. 6
This article presents my observations as a statistical consultant to the
Presidential Members of the Census Monitoring Board of the workings of
Census 2000 and my analysis of the census results. To evaluate the
accuracy of the census, I present criteria for defining accuracy and discuss
This article is substantially derived from the author's report to the 2000 U.S. Census
Monitoring Board, Presidential Members. This report is available at http://www.cmbp.gov.
Eugene Ericksen is a professor of Sociology and Statistics at Temple University. He
received an M.S. degree in Mathematical Statistics and a Ph.D. degree in Sociology from the
University of Michigan. He served as Co-Chair of the Special Advisory Panel to the Secretary of
Commerce on the 1990 Census. He also served as a consultant to the 2000 Census Monitoring
Board, Presidential Members. He would like to thank Frances Bourne of the Monitoring Board,
whose advice and help in obtaining information was invaluable.
1. See U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, A GUIDE TO
STATISTICAL ADJUSTMENT: How IT REALLY WORKS 5 (June 7, 2001) (addressing the debate
between statisticians over statistical adjustment).
2. MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS 75 (Barry Edmonston & Charles Schultze eds., 1995).
3. Id. at 78.
4. See U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 10 (Sept. 1, 2001) (showing a cost of $6.5 billion), available at, www.cmbp.gov (last
modified Sept.26, 2001).
5. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO CONGRESS I
(Sept. 1, 2001).
6. Id.
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the merits of various alternatives. I will then provide my own analyses and
draw conclusions.
As with many things that are large and complicated, the answer to the
question of whether Census 2000 was more accurate than its predecessors
depends on the criteria you use to judge. 7 Census 2000 appears to have
been successful by the key standard of allocating the population among
states, counties, and places. 8 It did not accomplish this feat, however, by
observing and counting a greater share of the population than it did in
1990.9
II. GOALS OF THE CENSUS
The constitutional goal of the census is to allocate the population
among states. 10 This goal conceivably could be attained without a complete
count of persons. For example, if every housing unit had two people living
in it, we could simply count the dwellings to get a good estimate of the
population distribution. This fanciful thought underlies a more serious
point. When the census misses 5% of minority populations, but less than
1% of non-Hispanic Whites, its results are biased against minorities.l" It is
better to have a consistent undercount of 3% for all groups than
undercounts of 3% for minorities and 0.3% for Whites. The latter census is
less fair, even though the net undercount of the national population is lower
than it would be for the alternative. The constitutional goal of the census is
to fairly allocate the population distribution among local areas. 12 The
differential, rather than the national net undercount, is the key statistic. 1 3
A second goal of the census is to describe the nature of the popula-
tion.14  We need to know the racial and ethnic composition of the
7. See id. at 3-5 (showing five things that worked well) and at 7-12 (showing six things to
improve).
8. See id. at 1 (stating that communities will benefit from fair representation because of
Census 2000).
9. See id. at 13 (stating that "severely undercounted neighborhoods remain severely
undercounted").
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states... according to their respective Numbers...").
11. In 1990, the Census Bureau obtained the following estimates of undercount: American
Indians, 12.2%; Hispanics, 5.0%; Blacks, 4.6%; Asians and Pacific Islanders, 2.4%; non-Hispanic
Whites and others, 0.7%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE
EXECUTIVE STEERING COMM. FOR ACCURACY AND COVERAGE EVALUATION POLICY 5 tbl. lb
(Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter ESCAP Report March 2001].
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
13. See ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 2 (stating both net and differential
undercoverage were reduced by Census 2000).
14. Barry Edmonston, Composition of the Population, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S.
CENSUS 75 (Margo J. Anderson ed., 2000).
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population, as well as observe the distributions of age, gender, income, and
country of birth.15 For this, we need to obtain information directly from
individuals, counting each person once and only once. 16
Many of the methods used in Census 2000, such as whole person
imputation, identifying duplicate cases by computer and then deleting them,
and improving the address register with local information help to achieve
the first goal. Some of these methods, however, detract from the second
goal.
A. PEOPLE COUNTED DIRECTLY AND CORRECTLY
In 1990, the official census count was 248.7 million, the adjusted
estimate was 252.7 million, and the implied net national undercount was 4.0
million.' 7 The comparable results for Census 2000 were 281.4 million
counted, 284.7 million estimated to exist, and an implied net undercount of
3.3 million.18 The net undercount was smaller in 2000 by 700,000 people,
and in percentage terms, the rate dropped from 1.6% to 1.2%.19
The Census Bureau estimated that 4.4 million of the counted people in
the 1990 census were "erroneous enumerations," people who were
fabricated by enumerators or counted twice at the same location.20 The
Census Bureau also stated that 2.2 million were "whole person
imputations," or people created by a computer program rather than counted
directly. 21 Combining these two groups and dividing by the total count, we
see that 2.65% of the official population was not counted directly and
correctly. If we subtract the 6.6 million imputations and erroneous
enumerations from the official count, we have 242.1 million people counted
directly and correctly in 1990. Subtracting this figure from the estimated
total, we estimate that (252.7 - 242.1 =) 10.6 million were omitted, or not
counted directly. They comprise 4.19% of the estimated total.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Letter from William G. Barron, Jr., Acting Director of U.S. Census Bureau, to Carolyn
B. Maloney, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 9, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Barron letter].
18. Id.
19. ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 4 tbl. I a and at 5 tbl. lb.
20. Memorandum from Ruth Ann Killion, Chief, Decennial Statistical Studies Div., U.S.
Census Bureau, to John Thompson, Assistant to the Assoc. Dir. For Decennial Census 4 tbl.l
(May 15, 1997) (regarding Gross Errors and Erroneous Enumerations in the 1990 Decennial
Census) (on file with author) [hereinafter Killion memo].
21. John H. Thompson, Census 2000-Decision on Release of Statistically Corrected
Redistricting Data, Address Before the Joint Statistical Meetings of the American Statistical
Association, Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thompson
Address].
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For Census 2000, the Census Bureau informs us that there were 3.1
million erroneous enumerations and 5.7 million imputations for a total of
8.8 million. 22 They comprise 3.13% of the official count, an increase over
1990. Subtracting, there were 272.6 million people directly and correctly
counted, and (284.7 - 272.6 =) 12.1 million omissions. 23 They comprise
4.25% of the estimated total, and this percentage is about the same as
obtained for 1990.
There was a shift in the nature of the undercount, though. In 1990, of
the estimated 10.6 million persons not directly counted, 8.4 million were
omissions and 2.2 million were imputations. 24 In 2000, of the estimated
12.1 million persons not directly counted, 6.4 million were omissions and
5.7 million were imputations. 25
B. OMISSIONS AND ERRONEOUS ENUMERATIONS
The Census Bureau's definition of erroneous enumerations is
controversial, as it omits a substantial category of people counted at the
wrong location. 26 For example, if a person moved from New York to
California on April 15, 2000, but was counted in California, he or she
would create two errors. New York would have one person too few and
California would have one person too many. Because such an error does
not affect the national net undercount, the Census Bureau does not include
it in its definition of erroneous enumeration. I believe that such an error
should be counted as an omission in New York and an erroneous
enumeration in California.
Moreover, had the person been counted in both states, creating only
one error, the Census Bureau would still not consider it to be an erroneous
enumeration. This seems especially incorrect to me. Other examples of
persons counted at locations other than their main residence, and not
considered erroneous by the Census Bureau, include: college students living
away from home, counted both at home and school; families counted at
their main and vacation homes; and one or both members of a commuter
marriage counted at both addresses. 27
22. Barron letter, supra note 17, at 3.
23. Id.
24. See Killion memo, supra note 20, at tbl.1 (showing the omissions) and Thompson
Address, supra note 21 (showing the imputations).
25. See Barron letter, supra note 17 (showing the Census 2000 omissions) and Thompson
Address, supra note 21 (showing the Census 2000 imputations).
26. See Killion memo, supra note 20, at tbl.1 & n.4 ("Erroneous Enumerations include
duplicates and fictitious. They do not include geocoding errors, unmatchables, unresolveds, nor
other people counted at the wrong address.").
27. Id.
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Adding these incorrectly located people to the count of erroneous
enumerations increases the Census Bureau estimate considerably. 28  In
1990, 1.8% of the "E-sample" was a fictitious or duplicate case; 2.2% of the
sample was counted at the wrong location.29 Adding these in, the total
estimate of people erroneously enumerated rose from 4.4 to 9.9 million.
The estimated total of imputations and erroneous enumerations is 12.1
million, 4.87% of the official count.
For Census 2000, the parallel calculation provides an estimate of 6.3
million erroneous enumerations by the broader definition. 30 Adding these
to the 5.7 million imputations gives a total of 12.0 million, 4.26% of the
official count. The percentage of persons not directly counted is lower than
in 1990, but the number of such cases is substantial in both censuses.
The Census Bureau estimates the number of omissions in the census as
the sum of erroneous enumerations and the net undercount. 31 In 1990, the
net undercount was 4.0 million, and by the Census Bureau's definition, 4.4
million were erroneously enumerated and 8.4 million were omitted.32 The
comparable total for Census 2000 is 6.4 million omissions. 33
The gross error is defined to be the sum of omissions and erroneous
enumerations. 34 By the Census Bureau's calculations, this quantity fell
from (8.4 + 4.4 =) 12.8 million in 1990 to (6.4 + 3.1 =) 9.5 million in
2000.35 By the expanded definition, there were 13.9 million omissions in
1990 for a gross error of 23.8 million.36 There were 9.6 million omissions
in 2000 for a gross error of 15.9 million. 37 Making no allowance for whole
person imputations, the decline from 23.8 to 15.9 million indicates
28. Id.
29. The "E-sample" is the sample of census records that the Census Bureau matched against
the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) survey data to determine the percentages
correctly and erroneously counted. Howard Hogan, The 1990 Post-Enumeration Survey:
Operations and Results, 88 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1047, 1048 (1993) [hereinafter Hogan 1990 PES].
The "P-sample" is the survey sample that is matched against the census records to determine the
percentages included and omitted from the count. Id. at 1047-48.
30. Obtained from the Census Bureau data file entitled "E-Sample Person Dual System
Estimation Output File," delivered to the Census Monitoring Board on Feb. 16, 2001.
31. In making these calculations, the Census Bureau did not estimate the number of
omissions directly. Noting that the net undercount is the difference between omissions and
erroneous enumerations, it calculated the number of omissions as the sum of the net undercount
and erroneous enumerations. Thus, for 1990 the net undercount is (4.4 + 4.0 =) 8.4 million.
32. Barron letter, supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. With 9.9 million erroneous enumerations, 4.0 million net undercount, and 13.9 million
omissions, the total gross error equals 23.8 million.
37. With 6.3 million erroneous enumerations, 3.3 million net undercount, and 9.6 million
omissions, the total gross error equals 15.9 million.
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substantial improvement in Census 2000, relative to 1990. Even so, the
number of omissions is very large.
It can be argued that each computer imputation represents one omitted
person whom the Census Bureau could not directly count, so the computer
created his or her record. Adding these omissions to the previous totals, we
obtain gross error estimates of 25.0 million in 1990 and 21.6 million in
2000.38
To summarize, the Census Bureau's achieved reduction in the net
national and differential undercounts did not necessarily occur because it
"counted" many more people directly and correctly. Depending on how
one defines erroneous enumerations, omissions, and the gross error, the
Census Bureau either did about as well in Census 2000 as it did in 1990, or
moderately better in 2000. Even by the definitions most favorable to the
Census Bureau, however, there was a substantial amount of indirect and
erroneous counting in 2000.
C. GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
If an omission and erroneous enumeration occur on the same block, but
to two different people, they cancel each other out at all meaningful levels
of geography. To evaluate the effect of errors on population distributions,
we need estimates of net undercount for each block. For example, if one
block had 100 counts, ten omissions and five erroneous enumerations, the
adjustment would add five people even though the gross error was fifteen.
An adjoining block might have eighty counts, one omission and nine
erroneous enumerations, and the adjustment would subtract eight people
even though the gross error was ten. The key statistic would be (5 + 8 =) 13
"changes."
In 1990, when the Census Bureau calculated adjustments to individual
blocks, it added 5.45 million people and subtracted 1.46 million people for
a total of 6.91 million changes. 39 This statistic is much smaller than the
previously calculated estimates of gross error for two reasons: (1) many
errors cancel out because they occur on the same blocks, and (2) the Census
Bureau's adjustment procedure does not fully correct for the distribution of
net errors across all blocks. I illustrate the point with two groups of blocks
included in the 1990 Post Enumeration Survey.
38. For 1990, adding the 2.2 million imputations to the 13.9 million actual omissions
provides a revised estimate of 16.1 million omissions. Adding this amount to the 9.9 million
erroneous enumerations provides a total of 25.0 million; for 2000 the comparable sum is (15.3 +
6.3 =) 21.6 million.
39. See Hogan 1990 PES, supra note 29, at 1054.
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The 1990 survey, as did the 2000 Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation
(A.C.E.) survey, sampled entire blocks and then calculated direct dual
systems estimates of each block's population. 40 In the examples just given
previously, the survey data would indicate census counts of 100 and 80
respectively, along with dual systems estimates of 105 and 72. In a perfect
world, the adjusted estimates for our two blocks would equal the direct
estimates, i.e., 105 and 72. The synthetic adjustment method used by the
Census Bureau, since it could not "explain" all the variation in net
undercount rates across sample blocks, considerably understated the block-
level adjustments.41
In my evaluation of the 2000 census for the Census Monitoring Board,
I illustrate the point using estimates for eleven sample blocks in Manhattan
and eight sample blocks in Ulster County, New York.4 2 I present the
percentage undercount as estimated by the direct and synthetic dual systems
estimates for each block.43 For both Manhattan and Ulster, the direct
estimates are more highly variable than are the synthetic estimates. 44 This
is demonstrated by the larger standard deviations for the direct (13.88% for
Manhattan and 5.89% for Ulster) than the synthetic (4.81% for Manhattan
and 1.28% for Ulster) estimates.4 5 More to the point, the synthetic estimate
is usually between zero and the value of the direct estimate.n6 For example,
block 1 in Manhattan has a direct estimate of -24.20% and a synthetic
estimate of -4.93%, while block 11 has estimates of 21.49% and 7.74%
respectively.47
40. Id.; see also HOWARD HOGAN, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AC-
CURACY AND COVERAGE EVALUATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION 5-8 (2000) (report prepared
for February 2-3, 2000 DSE Workshop of the National Academy of Science Panel to Review the
2000 Census); Stephen E. Fienberg, Capture-Recapture Methods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S.
CENSUS 49-54 (Margo J. Anderson ed., 2000) (describing dual systems estimation as a form of
systematic coverage improvement, based on the idea that using two sources of information will
provide a more accurate estimate of the population).
41. This is because the variables used to define post-strata, or sub-groups of the population,
in both 1990 and 2000 predict patterns of undercount in a general way for large aggregates.
Additional variables would be needed to predict which particular blocks in a neighborhood would
have larger and smaller undercounts or overcounts. This point does not indicate errors on the part
of the Census Bureau; it merely points out the inevitable limitations of any adjustment model.
42. Eugene Ericksen, An Evaluation of the 2000 Census, in U.S. CENSUS MONITORING
BOARD PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 28 tbl. 1 (Sept. 1, 2001) (obtained
from data file of 5,180 blocks from the 1990 census found at www.cmbc.gov) [hereinafter
Ericksen Evaluation]. Table I of this evaluation is a comparison of Direct and Synthetic Dual
Systems Estimates for 1990 in Manhattan and Ulster County, New York. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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The synthetic adjustments are therefore smaller in absolute value than
the direct estimates would be if they were available for all blocks.48 For
Manhattan and Ulster combined, the ratio of the average direct to synthetic
adjustment is about three.49
I repeated this calculation for the entire nation, and found that on aver-
age, the direct adjustment was 2.3 times larger than the synthetic adjust-
ment. Therefore, if the synthetic adjustment created 6.91 million changes,
as indicated above, the number of changes that needed to be made was
larger, i.e., (2.3 * 6.91 =) 15.9 million.
To explain it another way, had it been possible to sample all blocks in
the United States, and calculate dual systems estimates for each one, I esti-
mate that there would be 12.5 million additions and 3.4 million deletions to
be made. Because the factors included in the adjustment model cannot fully
predict the block-to-block variation in net undercount, the adjustments
actually calculated only account for a share, about 43%, of the adjustments
that need to be made. The Census Bureau's adjustments improve the
estimated distribution of population, but not perfectly. 50 Moreover, the
15.9, rather than the 6.91 million, better indicate the extent of the
undercount.
In Census 2000, the Census Bureau added 4.26 million and subtracted
1.00 million for a total of 5.26 million changes.Sl Assuming that the factor
of 2.3 is appropriate for Census 2000, then the estimated number of changes
that needed to be made would be (2.3 * 5.26 =) 12.1 million. Looking at it
another way, I estimate that there need to be 9.8 million additions and 2.3
million deletions across all blocks.
To summarize, when we define the gross error geographically, we see
substantial progress in Census 2000, by (15.9 - 12.1 =) 3.8 million. To the
extent, however, that the multiplier of 2.3 is too low, we should revise the
estimated number of changes for 2000 upward from 12.1 million, and the
actual improvement over 1990 would be smaller. 52
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The "imperfections" of the Census Bureau's method are likely to mean that remaining
errors, after adjustment, exist at the block level. These block level errors largely cancel out within
census tracts and legislative districts. The remaining errors for larger areas would be smaller on a
percentage basis than they are for blocks.
51. Press Release, Statement by William G. Barron, Jr. on the Current Status of Results of
Census 2000 Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation Survey, (July 13, 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Barron Press Release].
52. The associations between the variables used to define the post-strata and the pattern of
net undercount appear to be weak in 2000, suggesting that the factor of 2.3 might be too low, and
the estimate of 12.1 million therefore biased downward.
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III. PATTERNS OF UNDERCOUNT
A major story of Census 2000 is the reduction in the differential under-
count. 53 Both the Hispanic and the non-Hispanic Black undercounts in
Census 2000 are about half of what they were in 1990, the non-Hispanic
White undercount remained constant, and the differentials were cut sharp-
ly. 54 This improvement in the estimated allocation of population among
demographic groups reinforces the apparent reduction in gross error just
discussed.
In designing the survey and estimation procedure for Census 2000, the
Census Bureau defined post-strata, the creation of demographic subgroups,
not only by race and Hispanic origin, but also by tenure, metropolitan
status, region (for White homeowners) and the mail return rate.5 5 Only the
first three of these factors had a consistent effect on the estimated net
undercount. 56
Looking first at sixteen groups of non-Hispanic White homeowners de-
fined by geographic location, the rates cluster around zero.57 Six of the
estimates are overcounts, seven of them are between 0% and 0.99%, and the
remaining three are between 1.00% and 1.99%.58 Rates of undercount are
slightly higher in non-metropolitan areas than elsewhere. 59
Rates of undercount are somewhat higher for White non-homeowners
than for White homeowners, but the differences are not large.60 We also
observe this pattern for other racial groups. 61 For Hispanics, the under-
counts were higher in smaller and non-metropolitan areas, while the
opposite was true for the non-Hispanic Blacks.62 Indeed, the rates of net
undercount for non-Hispanic Blacks and Whites living in smaller and non-
metropolitan areas were similar to each other.63 Finally, for non-Hispanic
53. See ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 4 tbl.la and at 5 tbl.lb (showing
undercount rates and differences for the 1990 and 2000 censuses); see also Ericksen Evaluation,
supra note 42, at 29 tbl.2 (showing comparisons of undercount rates and differences for the two
censuses).
54. Id.
55. See Memorandum from Donna Kostanich, Assistant Div. Chief, Sampling and Esti-
mation Decennial Statistical Studies Div., to Howard Hogan, Chief, Decennial Statistical Studies
Div. 4 tbl.la (Apr. 19, 2000) (defining post strata for Census 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Kostanich memo].
56. Ericksen Evaluation, supra note 42, at 30-31 tbl.3 (showing net undercount rates for
post-strata groups).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
2001)
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Asians, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians the rates of undercount
were generally higher than average but substantially below their
comparable estimates for 1990.64
In general, the rates of undercount among different post-strata within
the same racial category are not greatly different from each other, the one
exception being owners versus non-owners. 65 As different states typically
have similar percentages of owner-occupied housing units, it would not be
expected to see large variations in undercount rates, once race has been
taken into account. For smaller areas such as counties and places, concen-
trations of owner or renter occupied housing may have a more substantial
impact.
A. RATES OF NET UNDERCOUNT FOR STATES
Relying on data provided by the Census Bureau, I have replicated its
estimates of net undercount by state.66 I have also calculated "synthetic"
estimates of undercount, or estimates of undercount that you would get if
you assumed that the national rates of undercount applied to each state.67
For example, if a state's population included 20% Hispanics, 30% non-
Hispanic Blacks, and 50% non-Hispanic Whites, its synthetic estimate
would be:
(0.20 * 2.85) + (0.30 * 2.17) + (0.50 * 0.67) = 1.56%.
Comparing the actual and synthetic estimates found in my evaluation
report to the Census Monitoring Board, they are quite similar. 68 The
estimates differ by more than a percentage point in only one state, Alaska.69
They differ by more than one-half of one percentage point in only eight
states.70
The synthetic and Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) esti-
mates for states are close because states are large and diverse areas
including rich and poor, city, suburban and rural, and owner and non-owner
areas. Moreover, the A.C.E. estimates themselves do not vary greatly, as
the range extends only from 0.29% (Minnesota) to 2.67% (Alaska).71
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 32-33 tbl.4 (showing comparison of A.C.E. synthetic estimates of undercount for
states).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Variability on tenure and other indicators is greater for local areas
within states. The Census Bureau defined minority post-strata by putting
large and medium metro areas into one group, and smaller and non-metro
areas into another group.72 This makes it possible to compare, within states,
the minority-White differentials in more and less metropolitan districts.73
For example, in Georgia, is the Black-White differential in cities like
Atlanta similar to the Black-White differential in more rural areas? In my
evaluation report for the Census Monitoring Board, I present comparisons
of undercount differentials, first for non-Hispanic Blacks and Whites and
second for Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites within areas more and less
metropolitan in the same state.74
To illustrate the method, we see in Alabama, that the Black-White dif-
ferential for large and medium metro areas was (2.50% - 0.66% =) 1.84%.75
The corresponding differential for smaller and non-metro areas was (0.94%
- 1.09% =) -0.15%, indicating a greater racial disparity in urban areas like
Birmingham and Mobile than elsewhere. 76
Looking at the Black-White differentials in different states, they are
consistently between 1.5% and 3% in the large/medium category. 77 In these
more metropolitan areas, the racial differential is consistent with the pattern
found in past censuses-the Black undercount is higher than the White.78
The story changes in the small/non-metro category, where there is no con-
sistent difference in Black and White undercount rates, and they are usually
close together. 79 Indeed, the Black rate is lower than the White rate, though
not by very much, in the rural and small city areas of fourteen of the thirty-
four states.80
This result has important implications for the South, as 85% of the non-
Hispanic Black population living in smaller and non-metropolitan areas is
located there. There appears to have been no racially differential under-
count in the less metropolitan South.81 While the Census Bureau has not
offered any explanation for this result, my hypothesis would focus on the
72. See Kostanich memo, supra note 55, at 4 tbl. 1 a.
73. Id.
74. Ericksen Evaluation, supra note 42, at 34-35 tbl.5 (showing state undercount rates) and
at 36-37 tbl.6 (showing comparison of Hispanic and Non-Hispanic White rates of undercount in
large and small metropolitan areas).
75. Id. at 34 tbl.5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 34-35 tbl.5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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relative difficulties of building complete address lists, without duplications,
in minority compared to White areas. I suspect that good address lists are
most difficult to build in minority areas of large cities.
The pattern differs for the Hispanic-White comparison. 82 As we would
expect from past censuses, Hispanic undercounts are consistently higher, by
a few percentage points, than non-Hispanic White undercounts. 83 Both
groups have higher undercounts in smaller and non-metropolitan areas, and
the differential between Hispanics and Whites is somewhat larger in those
areas as well.84 As a result, in many areas of the West and Southwest the
non-metropolitan rates of undercount are higher than those of large cities.85
B. UNDERCOUNT RATES FOR COUNTIES
The preceding discussion suggests that the variation in undercount
rates among counties may not be substantial. The racial differentials that
we have just observed are typically less than three percentage points and are
sometimes much less than this amount. 86 To study this question, I calcu-
lated undercount rate estimates for approximately 1500 counties located in
twenty-three states. The states were selected by one or both of two criteria:
(a) at least 25% of the population was something other than non-Hispanic
White, or (b) it had a substantial share of its population located in large
metropolitan areas as defined by the Census 2000 post-stratification plan.
States with large minority, or "big city" populations are more likely to have
variable rates of undercount among counties than the remaining less
metropolitan states with smaller minority populations.
To calculate the undercount estimates, I first divided the non-group
quarters populations of each county into eight categories---owners and non-
owners among Hispanics, non-Hispanic Blacks, non-Hispanic Whites, and
non-Hispanic others. I then obtained the ratios of adjusted to official
populations for each state as provided by the Census Bureau. I summarize
the results of my calculations in my evaluation report.87
The variation in county rates of undercount is not substantial. A full
87% of all counties studied have rates of undercount between 0.00% and
1.99%.88 There are only four counties, all with small populations, that have
82. Id. at 36-37 tbl.6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. id. at 34-35 tbl.5 and at 36-37 tbl.6.
87. Id. at 38-39 tbl.7 (showing rates of net undercount for counties sorted by state and
region).
88. Id.
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rates of undercount above 3%.89 Six percent of counties, generally located
in the Midwest, have overcounts but none of these is greater than one per-
centage point.90 As a general pattern, county rates of undercount are higher
in the West and lower in the Midwest. 91 The lack of a Black-White differ-
ential in less metropolitan areas had a substantial role in minimizing the
variation among counties located in Southern states.
C. EFFECTS OF THE REDUCTION IN THE RATE OF NET UNDERCOUNT
The ability of the Census Bureau to reduce both the national net and
the racially differential undercounts is a major success story. 92 Having
counted a greater share of the minority population in Census 2000, we
would expect to see the greatest improvement in areas with large minority
populations. This could make it difficult, however, to know how much of
the measured 1990-2000 population growth was real and how much was
due to a reduced undercount.
I conducted a study of those counties located in large metropolitan
areas, as defined by the Census Bureau. 93 I selected these counties, whose
collective Census 2000 official count is 86 million, because I believed these
counties to be the ones where census-taking problems were most serious in
1990. I sorted them into four groups defined by the percentage minority, as
(a) 50% or more, (b) 25% to 49.9%, (c) 10% to 24.9%, and (d) less than
10% minority. 94
I then obtained 1998 and 1999 population estimates from the Census
Bureau web site.95  Because these estimates did not incorporate an
adjustment for the undercount of the 1990 Census, they provided a good
benchmark to evaluate Census 2000. In other words, the 1999 estimate
added the 1990-1999 growth to the unadjusted 1990 count. I calculated a
"2000 Census Projection" by adding the 1998-1999 change to the 1999
estimate. For example, if the 1998 estimate was 180,000 and the 1999
estimate was 185,000, I calculated the 2000 projection to be 190,000. This
projection estimates what the Census 2000 count would have been had the
level of undercount been the same. It is subject to the errors generally
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO CONGRESS
I (Sept. 1, 2001).
93. Kostanich memo, supra note 55.
94. Minority in this context is defined as persons who did not self-identify as being only one
race, non-Hispanic White.
95. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/population/wwwl
estimates/countypop.htmn1 (July 30, 2001).
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
associated with population estimates, but there is no reason to expect these
errors to be consistently positive or consistently negative.
I compared the projection to the official 2000 count. If the count was
200,000, and the projection 190,000, then the projection was short by
10,000 or five percentage points. I summarized the relevant population
counts and projections by category and calculated the overall shortfalls by
county group. 96
Together, the counties with the largest minority populations had the
largest shortfall.97 They were projected to grow by 5.24%, but actually
"grew" by 9.25%.98 The shortfall of the population projection was 3.67
percentage points, and this shortfall may well reflect the effects of improved
counting.99 It is larger than the shortfalls of 1.34%, 1.10%, and -0.55%
found for the other three groups of counties. 100 In other words, those
counties with higher minority shares had larger shortfalls than did counties
with lower minority shares.101
New York City is an especially good example, as its projected growth
rate was 1.73% compared to actual growth of 9.36%. Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, and Hudson County, New Jersey had similarly high and unex-
pected amounts of growth. The shortfall was positive in fifteen of the six-
teen "high minority" counties. It was three percentage points or more in ten
of the sixteen counties. While there is variation, we see consistently high
and unexpected growth in urban areas with large minority populations. 02
Some of this growth is undoubtedly due to improved counting.
It is tempting to believe that this improvement is due to the use of the
Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) program. In this program,
local governments were allowed to submit lists of addresses that they
believed might not have been included in the master address file of the
census. 103 In all, the Census Bureau added just over 4 million addresses
through LUCA.104 One of the largest files of added addresses came from
New York City, where the Census Bureau accepted over 280,000 added
96. See Erickson Evaluation, supra note 42, at 40 tbl. 8 (showing projected and actual growth
in large metropolitan counties, 1999-2000).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS 4 (Sept. 1, 2001).
104. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, LUCA SUBMISSIONS
AND "ADDS" BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION (July 13, 2001).
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addresses.10 5 These comprised 8.88% of the eventual. city total of 3.2
million housing units. 106 LUCA's contribution compares to the 6.98%
"shortfall" in New York City, suggesting that LUCA played no small part
in creating a large amount of measured growth.
There is, however, no consistent pattern in other cities, some of which
such as Washington, D.C., and Suffolk County, Massachusetts, had large
unexpected growth and a small LUCA contribution. Other counties had the
opposite experience, i.e., they made a big LUCA contribution but did not
observe unexpected growth. The overall correlation between the ratios of
LUCA adds to all housing units and the shortfall of the population
projection, measured among counties, is -0.014.
IV. THE NATURE OF CENSUS ERROR
My emphasis on the improvement in Census 2000 in terms of the
national net and differential undercounts is not intended to minimize the
importance of the remaining error, both for political representation and fund
allocation. The Census Bureau decided not to adjust the results of Census
2000 on its Redistricting file, but it continues to consider whether or not it
should adjust these results for use in fund allocation and other purposes.' 07
This section discusses some of the issues associated with that decision.
Perhaps the major reason for the Bureau's decision was the incon-
sistency between national population totals calculated by the A.C.E. survey
and demographic analysis.108 As the Census Bureau put it in the March 1
ESCAP report, "[i]nitial D[emographic] A[nalysis] results, however,
presented a major inconsistency with the A.C.E. results-instead of
confirming a net undercount, DA estimates that Census 2000 overcounted
the national population by 1.8 million individuals . . . substantially below
the net undercount of 3.3 million shown by the A.C.E."109
The most likely culprit, from the perspective of the A.C.E., is the
underestimation of erroneous enumerations.110 In other words, the official
count includes more duplications, fabrications, and persons counted in the
wrong place than the A.C.E. indicated.Il' Increasing the estimated number
of erroneous enumerations would reduce the net undercount, but also
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, A GUIDE TO
STATISTICAL ADJUSTMENT: How IT REALLY WORKS 3-4 (June 7, 2001).
108. ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at ii.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id.
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increase the gross error and indicate that the quality of Census 2000 data
was not as good as originally thought. 12
There are good logical reasons to believe that the Census Bureau did
underestimate erroneous enumerations. There were 16 million counted
people excluded from the A.C.E., 8 million who lived in group quarters, 5.7
million who were whole person imputations in households, and 2.3 million
"late adds" who were cases originally thought to be duplicates but who
were added back into the count at the end of the census counting period. 13
The group quarters population could include overcounts, for example,
among people included in outdated lists of residents at places such as
hospitals, dormitories, and prisons. The number of "whole person" imputa-
tions, 5.7 million, may be too large, and to my knowledge the Census
Bureau has never studied the question of whether its computers created on
average the correct number of records for addresses where whole person
imputation occurred. Finally, we already have reason to suspect that many
of the 2.3 million "late census adds" were duplicated cases. The Census
Bureau may be studying these possibilities, along with their announced
studies of subjects such as balancing error. We await its conclusions.
In general, problems of census taking arise due to the circumstances in
which people live. There are neighborhoods where poverty is high, educa-
tion is low, use of foreign languages may be common, housing is crowded
or irregular, and crime rates are high; in these types of neighborhoods it is
especially difficult to count.114 Even where some but not all of these
conditions exist in extreme forms, census taking may still be difficult.115
These difficulties lead to higher rates of omission as well as higher rates of
erroneous enumeration, whole person imputation, and records with
incomplete and incorrect recording of characteristics such as race and
Hispanic origin.'16
The focus on the racially differential undercount sometimes leads to a
misplaced emphasis on racial identity itself, rather than the conditions in-
which many minority group members live, as an explanation for why the
undercount exists. Just as we would expect counting for non-Hispanic
Whites to be difficult when their living circumstances are difficult, we
would expect the counting for Hispanics and non-Hispanic Blacks to be
easier when their conditions were better.
112. Id. at 22.
113. Thompson Address, supra note 2 1.
114. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS 8-9 (Sept. 1, 2001).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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As part of its planning for Census 2000, the Census Bureau created a
census tract planning file including information on the demographic and
economic circumstances of local populations and tract level estimates of the
undercount.l 7 This file afforded me the opportunity to study the effects of
poverty, as it combines with race, on the undercount. Because the poverty
information is based on long-form data, it was not available for use in
calculating actual adjustments to either of the 1990 or 2000 censuses.
Working with the 1990 census tract data, I created five categories
defined by race. One included those areas with Native American majori-
ties. The second included that majority of tracts where the percentages of
non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic were each below 10%. I then identified
tracts (a) where each percentage was between 10% and 29.9%, (b) where
one or both were between 30% and 49.9% but neither was as high as 50%,
and (c) where there was either a Black or Hispanic majority. I then sub-
divided the tracts a second way, depending on the poverty rate. My cross-
classification made it possible to compare high and low poverty tracts
where the racial composition was similar, as well as tracts of different racial
composition where the poverty level was similar.
My evaluation report to the Census Monitoring Board shows that
higher rates of poverty are associated with higher rates of undercount.'l 8
Areas where the poverty rate is low and the population predominantly non-
Hispanic White have very low rates of undercount, 0.4%. 119 Increases in
this rate are associated both with increased percentages of poverty and
racial minorities.120 It should be noted that the rate of undercount for
predominantly white areas with a poverty rate over 50% is 3.6%, higher
than the corresponding rate, 2.9%, for areas with concentrated minority
populations but a low poverty rate. 121 Many of the variables actually used
to define post-strata, such as tenure and the mail return rate, are attempts to
create proxies for the difficult counting conditions created in part by
poverty. It is important, though, not to consider these proxies to be the
same as the conceptual variables that best explain the variation in rates of
undercount, but for which no data are available.
In the next step of my analysis, I attempted, for Census 2000, to
demonstrate the manner in which the various forms of census error
117. This file is called the Planning Database "CD-DSSD-comm-7 1990 data for Census
2000" and was delivered to the Census Monitoring Board on November 14, 2000.
118. See Ericksen Evaluation, supra note 42, at 41 tbl.9 (showing effects of poverty and
racial composition estimated rates on undercount for census tracts-1990 census).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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congregate in similar locations. I compared rates of omission, erroneous
enumeration, and imputation for groups of post-strata defined by the key
proxy predictors--race, Hispanic origin, tenure, and metropolitan status.122
This demonstrated that those post-strata with higher rates of net
undercount, generally those with minority non-owner populations, also
have higher rates of non-matching, erroneous enumeration, and imputa-
tion. 123 Indeed the correlations between the net undercount and these three
variables are, respectively, 0.88, 0.51, and 0.67. The correlation between
non-match and erroneous enumeration rates is 0.80. In sum, conditions of
poverty create difficult counting of all types. It is theoretically possible to
imagine that the Census Bureau might solve the problem of differential
undercount by increasing rates of erroneous enumeration and imputation in
poor neighborhoods. This would offset the higher rates of omission and
reduce the differential undercount. It would not mean, however, that a
greater proportion of people had been counted directly and correctly.
V. THE LIMITS OF IMPROVED COUNTING
The budget for Census 2000 was $6.55 billion, a large increase over the
$2.6 billion budget for the 1990 census even after inflation is taken into
account. 124 Using constant fiscal year 2000 dollars, the "per household"
cost rose from $36 in 1990 to $62 in 2000.125 There is little doubt that the
added spending improved census data quality.126 At the same time, there
are important types of census error that are impervious to budget size. 127
Better address lists are expensive to create, but they improve the
count. 128 While I was unable to demonstrate a direct link between LUCA
investment and the improvement of the count in specific areas, it is intui-
tively logical that it should exist. This is especially true in a place like New
122. Id. at 42 tbl. 10 (showing rates of undercount and other indicators of census error by
post-stratum group).
123. The Census Bureau uses the term "non-match" to refer to persons in the P-sample
whose record could not be found in the census.
124. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, 2000
CENSUS: REVIEW OF PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS BEST PRACTICES FOR FUTURE
OPERATIONS 12 tbl. (Aug. 2001) (comparing dollars associated with the 1970-2000 censuses). In
fiscal year 2000 dollars, the cost of the 1990 Census was $3.275 billion. Based on fiscal year
2000 dollars, the per officially counted person costs of the 1990 and 2000 censuses were, respec-
tively, $13.17 and $23.29. These calculations for 1990 are based on data given in "Bureau of the
Census Federal Funds," Appendices to the Budgets of the United States Governments, submitted
by the President of the United States, 1986-1996.
125. Id.
126. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS 13 (Sept. 1, 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id. at4.
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York City with a concentration of older housing subdivided into apartments
after originally being built for one family. Moreover, among the counties I
studied, areas with a larger minority share were more likely to participate in
LUCA, increasing the chance of reducing the differential undercount.
Paying enumerators more money also seems like a good return on in-
vestment, because enumerator mistakes are a major source both of omission
and erroneous enumeration. 129 Indeed, this investment may even lead to
savings since the count may be completed more quickly.130 Similarly,
money spent on advance publicity increases the mail return rate, and
reduces the time and error of subsequent data collection.131 Finally, by
investing in better and more extensive computer equipment, the Census
Bureau can improve its ability to manage the entire data collection and
estimation process.132
An increased Census Bureau budget is not likely, however, to reduce
by very much the frequency of errors made by individuals filling out their
census forms.133 The errors of people who enumerate themselves at two
locations, add inappropriate people to their census forms, and/or mistakenly
leave others off are usually honest mistakes.134 They occur frequently
among people filling out and mailing back the forms.135 Once such errors
have been made, there is no feature of the census process that can correct
them. Within-household errors are probably the major component of
omissions, and they are an important component of erroneous
enumerations. 136
Problems of obtaining correct enumerations within households lead me
to believe that census error is inevitable and is unresponsive to budget
increases and design improvements. People will always be left off census
questionnaires.137 This sort of omission is so prevalent and impervious to
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 12.
133. See Edmonston & Schultze, supra note 2, at 102 (advocating respondent-friendly
forms).
134. ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 12.
135. Eugene P. Ericksen, Errors in the Census, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. CENSUS 207
(Margo J. Anderson ed., 2000) [hereinafter Errors in the Census].
136. Hogan 1990 PES, supra note 29, at 1056; see also Elizabeth Martin, Who Knows Who
Lives Here? Within-Household Disagreements as a Source of Survey Coverage Error, 63 PUB.
OPINION Q. 220, 220-36 (1999); Eugene Ericksen et al., Report on the 1990 Decennial Census and
Post-Enumeration Survey, submitted to the U. S. Secretary of Commerce, June 21, 1991, app. A,
tbl.6.
137. Hogan 1990 PES, supra note 29, at 1056.
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census method that we should always expect it to occur in the millions. 138
The only way that the net undercount could ever be zero, or close to it, is to
have the numbers of omissions and erroneous enumerations offset each
other.139 The problem would then be that the geographic distributions of
omissions and erroneous enumerations would differ, and the differences
would cause distortions to the census results.140 This is why some statisti-
cal adjustment is essential to correct the inevitable errors of the initial
count. 141 And, throughout the 1990s until this year, the Census Bureau
agreed. 142
A. IMPUTING AND DELETING RECORDS
Statistical estimation to adjust the census has been a controversial
issue, especially when it appeared that the Census Bureau planned to adjust
the results of Census 2000.143 Due in part to the political opposition to
adjustment, the Census Bureau received a substantial budget increase, for a
stated goal of "counting," as opposed to "creating people by computer." 44
Although it did not adjust Census 2000, the Census Bureau did reduce both
the national net and the differential undercount.145 Yet it did not do these
things simply by "counting more people." Moreover, if it had adjusted, it
could have "eliminated" or corrected the remaining undercount.
Had an adjustment taken place, about 4.3 million records would have
been added to the count and 1.0 million deleted.146 These changes are what
the political opposition to adjustment prevented. Yet, a computer imputed
5.7 million persons.147 This imputation makes use of information about
people who live in houses similar to those houses where the information
was needed, but it is not based on direct observation. Critics of adjustment
point out that people living in places like Midland, Texas, may be used to
138. Id.
139. Errors in the Census, supra note 135, at 207.
140. Id.
141. Hogan 1990 PES, supra note 29, at 1057.
142. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, A GUIDE TO
STATISTICAL ADJUSTMENT AND HOW IT REALLY WORKS 1 (June 7, 2001).
143. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 5 (Sept. 1, 2001), available at, www.cmbp.gov (last modified Sept. 26, 2001).
144. MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS OF
CENSUS TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 211-13 (paperback ed. 2001).
145. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1 (Sept. 1, 2001).
146. Barron Press Release, supra note 51.
147. Thompson Address, supra note 21.
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change the populations of people living in New Haven, Connecticut.148 Yet
they are silent about the fact that donors and intended recipients of
imputation are often very different.I49 For example, it is very likely that
information about a White male, age thirty-five could be used for a Black
female, age fifty-seven. Imputation, like adjustment, improves the
statistical estimate on average. For both methods, there are individual
examples that appear to be incongruous.
The Census Bureau did not limit its use of the computer to imputation.
Late in the census process, the Bureau used a complex computer program to
identify about 6 million duplications in its data file.150 As the Census
Bureau put it,
[A]nalyses of the April 2000 and June 2000 MAF extracts still
indicated that there was an overcoverage problem. These concerns
led the Census Bureau to identify and remove housing units
(MAFIDs) from Census 2000. Housing units were identified as
being included in error with a relatively high likelihood based on a
set of person and address matching rules.151
It eliminated 3.64 million person records, or in other words, it took
records of "real people" out of the census. 52 The Census Bureau returned
the other 2.37 million people to the count, and they are referred to as "late
census adds."153 Because the deletion and reinstatement operations took
place late in the census process, the Census Bureau was not able to include
the late census adds in the A.C.E.154
A review of these materials makes it clear that the Census Bureau
monitored the level of the count throughout the census data collection
period and took the appropriate action that it deemed necessary. When the
count appeared to be too large, and therefore the rate of erroneous
enumeration too high, the Census Bureau eliminated 6 million person
records. 155 Most of the information on these records was received from
148. U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BOARD CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS, A GUIDE TO
STATISTIcAL ADJUSTMENT: How IT REALLY WORKS 15 (June 7, 2001).
149. Id. at 18.
150. Memorandum from Howard Hogan, Chief, Decennial Statistical Studies Div., to Susan
Miskura, Chief, Decennial Mgmt. Div. (Nov. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Hogan memo]; Memorandum
from Susan M. Miskura, Chief, Decennial Mgmt. Div., to Preston J. White, Assistant to the Assoc.
Dir. for Decennial Census (Nov. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Miskura memo].
151. Hogan memo, supra note 150.
152. Miskura memo, supra note 150.
153. Id.
154. ESCAP Report March 2001, supra note 11, at 25-26.
155. Miskura memo, supra note 150.
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persons actually living in the affected households.156 Later, when it
appeared that they might have reduced the count by too great an amount,
they put about 2.4 million of the records back in. 157 The net effect of these
operations is that the eventual net undercount of 1.18% is substantially an
artifact of the Census Bureau's decisions about the apparently duplicated
housing.
Left unasked is the question of how these 6 million (now 3.64 million)
duplications occurred in the first place. Their inclusion in the census would
have doubled the rate of erroneous enumeration by the Census Bureau's
definition. 158
Review of the Census Bureau procedure for removing duplicates re-
veals a complex method relying on the assumption that the census forms in
question were filled out correctly. If a family filled out two forms, but did
so inconsistently, the Census Bureau may not have recognized it as a
duplication. Like adjustment, "duplication removal by computer" will
improve census distributions on average, but it will also make many
individual mistakes. Duplication removal procedures are statistical in that
they rely on prespecified rules applied consistently to actual census data. A
rational census policy would apply the same criteria to duplication removal
that are applied to statistical adjustment. The current policy, which depicts
adjustment as a statistical procedure not to be used, but duplication removal
as a permissible procedure, makes a very fine distinction. I am not certain
that it is meaningful.
B. ADJUSTMENT POSTSCRIPT
On October 17, 2001 the Census Bureau revised its undercount
estimates and made its final decision on the possibility of adjustment of
Census 2000.159 After further research, it drew the following conclusion:
After assessing considerable new evidence, [The Executive Steer-
ing Committee for A.C.E. policy] now recommends that unadjust-
ed Census 2000 data also be used for non-redistricting purposes.
The effect of this new evidence is that the Accuracy and Coverage
Evaluation (A.C.E.) overstated the net undercount by at least 3
million persons. The cause of this error was that the A. C. E.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. For the Census Bureau, the increase is from 3.1 to 6.74 million, and if we add persons
counted at the wrong location to the count of erroneous enumerations, the increase is from 6.3 to
9.94 million.
159. REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE STEERING COMM. FOR ACCURACY AND COVERAGE
EVALUATION POLICY ON ADJUSTMENT FOR NON-REDISTRICTING USES 1 (Oct. 17, 2001).
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failed to measure a significant number of census erroneous
enumerations, many of which were duplicates. 60
In other words, the Census Bureau increased the estimated number of
erroneous enumerations by at least 3 million.'61 Assuming that the number
was exactly 3 million, then the A.C.E. estimate of the national population
was reduced to 281.7 million, for a net undercount of (1 - 281.4 / 281.7 =)
0.1%.
The gross error, however, was increased. Adding the 3 million to the
original Census Bureau estimate of 3.1 million erroneous enumerations
provides a revised total of 6.1 million. Adding these to the estimated 6.4
million omissions leads to a revised gross error estimate of 12.5 million,
about the same number that was observed in 1990.162
We see, therefore, that the reduced net undercount does not indicate an
improved census. For the constitutional purpose of allocating political
representation to states and local areas, the larger gross error indicates a
more substantial problem than appeared to exist before. The extent of the
problem depends on the tendency of omissions and erroneous enumerations
to occur in different types of areas. 163
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted to summarize, discuss, and analyze the
issues of Census 2000 that I consider to be most pertinent. The Census
Bureau improved Census 2000 substantially over its 1990 counterpart,
helped no doubt by a doubling of the "per person" census budget. Even so,
we must understand the limits of our ability to improve things by "better
counting."164 The Census Bureau, though it did not statistically adjust the
census through the A.C.E. survey, did conduct an adjustment of sorts when
it deleted 3.64 million apparent duplicates from the count. 165 I believe that
we need to broaden the discussion of census error and its possible remedies
to include operations such as imputation and the deletion of possibly
duplicate records.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Hogan 1990 PES, supra note 29, at 1056.
163. Errors in the Census, supra note 135, at 207.
164. Edmonston & Schultze, supra note 2, at 56.
165. Miskura memo, supra note 150.
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